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Abstract 
 
In facilities handling combustible dusts, the isolation of propagating deflagrations 
requires great attention due to the potential catastrophic consequences of secondary dust 
explosions. While the ability of dust explosions to propagate is widely recognized, some 
misconceptions still exist. One of the common myths is that a dust explosion cannot 
propagate through small diameter pipes and that explosion isolation may not be required 
in that case.  
 
This paper first presents a simplified theory of flame propagation in pipes. Dust explosion 
experiments performed in industrial-scale pipes smaller or equal to 4 inches (or 100 mm) 
in diameter are then reviewed. The findings of the experiments are interpreted in the light 
of the simplified theory.  
 
Our study reveals that dust explosion propagation has been consistently observed in pipes 
with a diameter as small as one inch. While the likelihood of flame propagation seems to 
decrease with pipe diameter and other “chemical” and “engineering” factors, it remains a 
realistic scenario and therefore should be addressed in the design and operation of 
powder handling systems. 
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Nomenclature: 
 
AV:  vent area (m2) 
D:  pipe diameter (m) 
DDT:  deflagration to detonation transition 
KSt:  deflagration index for dusts (bar.m/s) 
MAIT:   minimum auto ignition temperature (K) 
MEC:   minimum explosible concentration (g/m3) 
MESG: maximum experimental safe gap (mm) 
MIE:  minimum ignition energy (mJ) 
Pmax: maximum pressure of an unvented deflagration initially at atmospheric 
pressure (barg) 
Pred:   reduced pressure after deflagration venting (barg) 
Pstat:  static burst pressure of the vent (barg) 
Sf:  flame velocity or speed (m/s) 
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1.Introduction 
 
When a combustible dust cloud is ignited within a process vessel, large amounts of heat 
and high pressures are generated in milliseconds. The resulting dust deflagration may 
compromise the vessel’s structural integrity, unless it is adequately protected. 
Nevertheless, the explosion pressure will push the fireball through any existing openings, 
including process interconnections. The flame front will stretch and speed up due to 
increased turbulence, increasing the severity of the initial event. Ultimately, a more 
violent secondary deflagration can take place when the flame reaches the next process 
vessel, such that existing protection measures may well fail under these aggravated 
conditions. 
 
Many accidents involving secondary explosions [1] and flame propagation [2, 3] have 
been reported in the literature, and numerous researchers have carried out laboratory 
experiments to better understand flame propagation features. However, flame 
propagation in industrial-scale piping is still misunderstood, leading to some common 
myths in the industry [4]. 
 
This paper focuses on one of the most tenacious myths, namely that propagation of dust 
explosions in small diameter pipes is not possible. This myth has some important 
practical consequences, since the previous edition of NFPA 654 standard [5] allowed the 
absence of explosion isolation for pipes with a diameter below 4 inches (see Appendix).  
 
After a short insight on flame propagation mechanisms, a review of dust explosion 
propagation experiments in pipes smaller or equal to 4 inches (or 100 mm) in diameter is 
presented by increasing order of complexity: first we examine flame propagation 
following ignition of a dust cloud in a pipe, then in a vessel connected to an open pipe, 
and finally in a vented vessel connected to an open pipe. Our study shows that explosion 
propagation is possible in industrial-scale pipes with a diameter as small as one inch [6]. 
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2.Simplified theory of flame propagation and acceleration 
 
2.1.Laminar flame propagation and critical diameter 
 
The basic mechanism of laminar flame propagation can be described using a heat balance 
composed of two terms: rate of heat production versus and rate of heat loss [7, 8]. The 
rate of heat release is a function of the fuel “chemistry” and stoichiometry, and 
proportional to the flame area, which for scaling purposes can be taken as proportional to 
the square of the diameter of the pipe. On the other hand, the rate of heat loss from the 
flame scales with the perimeter of the flame, and is thus assumed to increase linearly with 
the pipe diameter. According to this simplified theory, therefore, laminar flame 
propagation is only possible above a critical diameter for which heat release rate is larger 
than heat loss rate, as suggested from the intersection of these two curves in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Rate of heat production versus rate of heat loss as a function of pipe diameter. 
 
This critical diameter is somewhat difficult to determine experimentally for dust flames, 
but is usually approximated using two parameters, namely the Maximum Experimental 
Safe Gap (MESG) and the quenching diameter. The MESG is determined in a 
standardised experiment (IEC 60079-1-1) involving a flameproof vessel, capped by a lid 
with a 25 mm width joint. The explosive mixture is contained both inside and outside the 
vessel. The MESG is then defined as the maximum gap of the joint which prevents any 
transmission of an explosion [9]. Eckhoff reports the experimental work of Jarosinski et 
al. [10] and later Schuber [11] on the determination of MESG for dusts. Jarosinsky et al. 
obtained a MESG value for cornstarch between 1.5 mm and 2.2 mm, while Schuber 
reports a value of 1.8 mm. The quenching diameter, Dq, represents the smallest diameter 
of a pipe in which a self-sustained laminar flame can propagate. In his review of dust 
explosion propagation in pipes, Proust [12] provides values of Dq for cornstarch-air 
mixtures (10 mm), aluminum dust-air mixtures (16 mm), and a quenching diameter larger 
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than 100 mm for coal dust-air mixtures. Jarosinski et al. [13] report values of 5.5 mm for 
cornstarch, 10.4 mm for aluminum, 25 mm for fine particles of coal and 190 mm for 
coarse particles of coal.  These two parameters (MESG and quenching diameter) are 
closely related, since they involve the same phenomena described above, i.e. a 
competition between heat release and heat loss. Eckhoff [14] suggested the rule of thumb: 
Dq = 2 x MESG. Regardless of the particular mixture, it is clear that both parameters fall 
in a range significantly smaller than the dimensions of most pipes in industrial processes.  
 
2.2.Turbulent flame propagation and optimum diameter 
 
MESG and quenching diameters represent the situation of a laminar propagating flame, 
which is a rather ideal case that can only stand in the early phases of combustion. In 
reality, a flame will transit to a turbulent regime due to factors such as flame instabilities, 
turbulence generated by pipe roughness or obstacles, and pressure wave/flame 
interactions. This takes place, for example, when a mixture is ignited at a pipe closed end 
(as further illustrated in paragraph 3.1): under these conditions, the expanding gases 
accelerate the flame front, generate additional turbulence, which increases flame area, 
leading to an increasingly hazardous situation associated with the greater heat release. 
The process of turbulence generation and flame acceleration is limited by the competing 
roles of pipe flow resistance and heat loss. An “optimum” diameter exists for which there 
is a maximum acceleration, which is typically several orders of magnitude larger than the 
original MESG or quenching values. 
 
Experiments by Pineau & Ronchail [15], and later by Srinath et al. [16] provide clear 
evidence of the three propagation regimes described above:  
1. No flame propagation for diameters below a critical value, depending on the fuel 
reactivity;  
2. A steady (or laminar) flame propagation without flame acceleration for pipes 
larger than the critical diameter; 
3. An accelerated (or turbulent) flame propagation, possibly leading to a deflagration 
to detonation transition (DDT), for an “optimum” diameter and sufficiently long 
pipes.  
 
2.3.Volumetric explosion and its influence on flame propagation in pipes 
 
The first two sections considered the case of the ignition of a dust-air mixture in a pipe. 
However, in a real industrial explosion, ignition would most likely take place in a vented 
vessel of considerable volume, rather than in a pipe, as pipes often operate with a dust 
concentration below the minimum explosible concentration (MEC). The addition of this 
primary volume provides an additional driving force for the propagation of the explosion: 
the expanding gases generated by the combustion of the dust-air mixture in this large 
volume (compared to the pipe volume) acts as a piston, pushing and accelerating the 
flame front down the pipe, generating additional turbulence and increasing flame area. 
This phenomenon is further illustrated by experiments reviewed in sections 3.2 and 3.3 
involving initiating vessels connected to pipes.  
 
This piston action is more pronounced for higher overpressures and longer duration 
explosions (i.e. greater impulse); this means ultimately that the design (i.e. explosion 
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pressure resistance) and the method of protection of the process vessel will largely impact 
the propagation likelihood and distance within a given pipe. For a closed vessel, all the 
expanding gases are redirected to the pipes, thus fully promoting flame propagation; in 
the case of a vented vessel, on the other hand, part of the expanding gases are discharged 
through the relief area and only the remainder participates in flame propagation. The 
duration and severity of the explosion in the vented enclosure depends both on the static 
burst pressure of the vent panel (controlling how early the discharge will occur) and its 
area (controlling how much gases will be discharged). These engineering factors play an 
important role in flame propagation through pipes.  
 
Based on the simplified theory established above, the flame velocity can be described as 
the combined effects of the expansion velocity of the burnt gases driven by the primary 
explosion, and the turbulent flame velocity. The latter depends not only on the overall 
equivalence ratio, temperature and pressure, but also on particle concentration, size 
distribution and spatial homogeneity in the mixture. 
 
2.4.Interlinked explosions in vessel-pipe arrangements 
 
Of course, an explosion in a vessel-pipe system involves more complex phenomena than 
what is presented in this simplified theory. Research on the explosion pressure relief 
through short pipes (namely vent ducts) has led to the current understanding that two 
interlinked explosions actually occur: a primary explosion in the vessel and a secondary 
explosion at the interconnection with the vent duct, partly overlapping in time and 
interacting with each other.  
 
Numerous researchers [17-24] have shown that the presence of a duct downstream of the 
venting device increases the reduced explosion pressure in a vented vessel. This was first 
attributed to the flow resistance induced by the duct itself (i.e. pressure losses). However, 
a more in-depth analysis revealed that this pressure enhancement must be attributed to the 
occurrence of a secondary explosion in the duct.  
 
Ferrara et al. [24] clearly explain the mutual interaction between internal (in the vessel) 
and external (in the duct) explosions: 
• In the initial phase of the explosion and after the vent bursts, unburnt dust and air 
is pushed out of the vessel into the vent duct; 
• When the explosion pressure rises and the flow velocity through the vent duct 
increases, the flow restriction at the vessel-pipe interconnection generates a highly 
turbulent fluid area with intense mixing of dust and air (Figure 2). When the 
flame enters the vent duct, an intense and violent secondary explosion occurs, 
associated with very high rates of pressure rise (in some cases, this intense mixing 
can also result in flame quenching [23]); 
• The resulting pressure rise in the duct develops early (while the vessel pressure is 
still moderate) leading to flow reversal into the vessel (Figure 3, [25]). Some 
amount of rapidly burning mixture returns back to the vessel, which contributes to 
the vessel pressure increase, as well as the blockage of the outflow from the 
vessel and the intensification of combustion of the unburned mixture previously 
left in the vessel. The more violent the secondary explosion in the duct is 
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(depending on the turbulence intensity, the reactivity of the fuel, etc.), the higher 
the second peak pressure in the vessel.  
 
Ultimately, the pressure inside the vessel can be much higher with a connected pipe 
than without (Figure 4, [26]). The pipe therefore does not fulfill its role of pressure 
relief device, decreasing the vessel pressure, but, on the opposite, can momentarily 
aggravate the severity of the primary explosion in the vessel. This is in contradiction 
with the common belief that openings with pipes have a moderating effect on 
explosion severity [27] and can have some important practical implications, since 
vent sizing of industrial vessels uses a simplified approach which does not consider 
the contribution of a potential secondary explosion in connected pipes. 
 
   
 
 
Figure 2. Effect of a restriction on flow (top) and effect of pipe dimension  
on flame front distortion (bottom) according to Ponizy & Leyer [23] 
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Figure 3. Flame transmission from the test chamber to the tube (left) and flow reversal in 
3 steps [25] 
 
Figure 4. Pressure variation in the test chamber - Curve a: vessel alone - Curve b: vessel 
+ duct [26] 
 
The next section discusses dust explosion propagation experiments performed in 
industrial-scale, small diameter pipes that illustrate the different explosion regimes 
described above. They are presented in increasing order of complexity and according to 
the simplified and qualitative theory presented above:  
1. Ignition of a dust cloud in a pipe;  
2. Ignition of a dust cloud in a closed vessel connected to an open pipe;  
3. Ignition of a dust cloud in a vented vessel connected to an open pipe.  
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3.Experimental evidence of dust explosion propagation in small diameter pipes 
 
3.1.Explosion propagation following ignition of a dust cloud in a pipe 
 
3.1.1.Matsuda et al. (1982) 
 
Matsuda et al. [28] conducted dust explosion propagation experiments in a full-scale 
pneumatic conveying system consisting of a dust feeder connected to a 1.3-m3 vented bag 
filter by pipes of varying diameters and lengths (Table 1). Polystyrene, ABS resin, wood 
and coal dusts were used in the experiments. Ignition was provided directly in the pipe, 
using either a flame fueled by an acetylene-air mixture or a continuous induction spark at 
about pipe mid length.  
 
Test Pipe diameter (mm) Pipe length (m) 
A 100 37 
B 75 and 100 51.5 and 35 
Table 1. Pipe characteristics for experimental set ups A and B [28] 
 
Propagation of the explosion was investigated as a function of the conveying velocity in 
the pipe (from 10 m/s to 40 m/s) and dust concentration (from 200 g/m3 to 2,000 g/m3) in 
order to determine extinction air velocities experimentally.  
 
Three types of flame propagation behavior are described by the authors:  
1. Absence of flame propagation away from the ignition source;  
2. Partial propagation over a fraction of the length of the pipe;  
3. Propagation over the whole length of the pipeline, leading to an explosion in the 
filter unit. 
 
For both test A and test B configurations, partial or full length explosion propagation was 
noticed for all dusts tested through the 75-mm and 100-mm pipes. The propagation 
distance increased when decreasing either the conveying velocity or the dust 
concentration. The highest flame velocities were achieved with polystyrene and ABS 
resin, which are the most reactive dusts. Except some local variations, the flame speeds 
tend to decrease as the flame moved away from the ignition source.  
 
3.1.2.Vogl (1996) 
 
Vogl [29] conducted dust explosion propagation experiments in a full-scale pneumatic 
conveying system consisting of a dust feeder connected to a vented cyclone by pipes of 
several diameters (100-mm, 150-mm and 200-mm) and lengths (40-m or 48-m). 
Cornstarch (KSt = 217 bar.m/s), lycopodium (KSt = 154 bar.m/s), and wheat flour (KSt = 
114 bar.m/s) were used as fuels. The dust concentration in the pipe was varied over 75-
450 g/m3, and the conveying velocity was varied from 15 to 30 m/s. Ignition was 
provided by 2-kJ pyrotechnical igniters, either near the open end or in the middle of the 
pipe. Piezoelectric pressure transducers and flame detectors (photodiodes) were located 
along the pipe to measure explosion pressures and flame arrival times.  
Ignition near the open end of the pipe led to very slow flame propagation. Vogl explains 
this effect by noting that the expanding product gases are ejected out of the open end, and 
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thus are not accelerated towards the fresh mixture. In contrast, ignition at the middle of 
the pipe led to flame acceleration, resulting in apparent deflagration-to-detonation 
transition (DDT) and over-driven detonations in some cases. The most extreme effects 
occurred with the most reactive dust (cornstarch: highest KSt-value), for the largest pipe 
diameter (200 mm) and the longest pipe (48 m). Maximum flame velocities of over 1,000 
m/s and explosion pressures of above 20-40 bar were observed. In these cases, the 
conveying velocity was not important, as the maximum flame velocities were often over 
10 times larger than the maximum flow velocities (15 to 30 m/s).  
 
Both flame velocity and explosion pressure were reduced with decreasing pipe diameter. 
Vogl explains that a reason for this effect may be an increasing heat loss due to 
increasing surface/volume ratio as well as an increasing pipe resistance against the 
expansion flow. Interestingly, no flame propagation against the conveying flow could be 
observed under the following conditions: 
• Wheat flour (KSt = 114 bar.m/s) and pipe diameter D < 150 mm; 
• Lycopodium (KSt = 154 bar.m/s) and pipe diameter D < 100 mm. 
An empirical equation was developed for the estimation of a boundary condition with 
which flame propagation against the conveying direction could not be obtained. 
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3.2.Explosion propagation following ignition of a dust cloud in a closed vessel 
 
The experiments discussed in this paragraph differ from those presented above in the 
following key aspect: the initial explosion takes place in a small closed volume. The 
confinement leads to pressure rise providing an additional driving force for dust 
explosion propagation.  
 
3.2.1.Pineau & Ronchail (1982) 
 
Pineau & Ronchail [30] report dust explosion propagation tests in two types of 
experimental apparatuses and geometries:  
• Case 1 involved the explosion of wheat flour in straight pipes of varying 
diameters: 250, 400, and 700 mm; 
• Case 2 involved the explosion of wheat flower and wood flour (more reactive) 
using an initiating vessel of 0.1-m3 or 1-m3 volume and connected to pipes of 25, 
50, and 100 mm.  
Pipes of length 10, 25, and 40 m, were used in both cases 1 and 2.  
 
In Case 1, four types of boundary conditions were studied, (i) ignition at a closed end of 
the pipe, with one open end, (ii) same as (i), but partially closed at open end, (iii) both 
ends closed, and (iv) same as (ii), but with ignition midway in the pipe: 
• As expected from the previous discussion, the maximum flame acceleration 
occurred for condition (i), for ignition at the closed of the pipe. The highest 
acceleration took place with the smallest diameter of 250 mm. This is explained 
by the fact that the pipe diameter is larger than the quenching or critical diameter, 
but sufficiently small to generate large flame acceleration by virtue of the 
expansion of the burned gases;  
• Condition (ii) with the partial closing of the end of the pipe led to increased 
pressures. All results showed flame acceleration, except in the smallest diameter 
pipe, where flame deceleration occurred; 
• For condition (iii), pipes were completely closed off, forming a constant volume 
elongated cylinder, and thereby, in comparison with the other, eventually 
impeding the acceleration of the expanding flame;  
• The final case for condition (iv) with ignition at the center generated two flames 
propagating towards opposite ends. The limited length for acceleration means that 
the speed was lower than the ignition at the closed end.  
 
In Case 2, experiments using wheat flour and wood flour were carried out in a setup 
comprising an initiating vessel connected to a pipe of much smaller diameter than in Case 
1:  
• Flame propagation over the entire pipe length (or “full” propagation) occurred 
more frequently with wood flour than with wheat flour due to its higher reactivity. 
In addition, significant flame acceleration, including numerous cases of transition 
from deflagration to detonation (DDT), occurred with wood flour but never with 
wheat flour under identical conditions: in the 100-mm pipe, pronounced flame 
acceleration occurred, with a high probability of a DDT (75 to 100%), and values 
of maximum pressures (> 16 bar, up to 32 bar) characteristic of over-driven 
detonations; 
12 
 
• Full flame propagation was also more frequently observed as the pipe diameter 
goes up. This is shown in Tables 2 and 3. Nevertheless, flame propagation still 
occurred in the 25-mm diameter, 10-m long pipe for both fuels over a distance of 
7 meters; 
• As discussed in the simplified theory presented in paragraph 2, the volume of the 
initiating vessel also has a significant influence on the full flame propagation 
likelihood; this is especially seen in the case of wood flour, with a likelihood of 
78% and 50% in a 50-mm diameter pipe (respectively 10-m and 25-m long) 
connected to the 1-m3 vessel, versus only 50% and 0% when connected to the 0.1-
m3 vessel (Table 2). 
 
Dust Vessel 
volume 
(m3) 
Duct 
length 
(m) 
Frequency 
of flame 
propagation 
to the end 
of the duct 
Maximum 
flame 
propagation 
distance 
(m) 
Wheat flour 0.1 25 0/3 (0%) < 15 
Wood flour 0.1 10 3/6 (50%) 10 
Wood flour 0.1 25 0/9 (0%) < 15 
Wheat flour 1 10 1/2 (50%) 10 
Wheat flour 1 25 0/2 (0%) 10 
Wheat flour 1 40 0/2 (0%) 20 
Wood flour 1 10 7/9 (78%) 10 
Wood flour 1 25 4/8 (50%) 25 
Wood flour 1 40 3/7 (43%) 40 
Table 2 .Dust explosion propagation tests in a 50-mm straight duct [30] 
 
Dust Vessel 
volume 
(m3) 
Duct 
length 
(m) 
Frequency 
of flame 
propagation 
to the end 
of the duct 
Maximum 
flame 
propagation 
distance 
(m) 
Wheat flour 0.1 25 5/7 (71%) 25 
Wheat flour 1 25 3/3 (100%) 25 
Wheat flour 1 40 5/6 (83%) 40 
Wood flour 0.1 25 1/6 (17%) 25 
Wood flour 1 25 4/4 (100%) 25 
Wood flour 1 40 7/8 (88%) 40 
Table 3. Dust explosion propagation tests in a 100-mm straight duct [30] 
 
Experiments conducted by Pineau & Ronchail show that likelihood of explosion 
propagation relates well to the fuel reactivity (wood flour > wheat flour), pipe diameter 
(100-mm > 50-mm > 25-mm) and initiating vessel volume (1-m3 > 0.1 m3). In the vast 
majority of the cases reported by the authors (19/21), an explosion occurring in a 1-m3 
vessel connected to a 100-mm pipe led to full flame propagation (25 meters or 40 meters). 
As noted at the beginning of this paragraph 3.2, the addition of a small primary volume 
(0.1-m3 or 1-m3) is seen to further promote dust explosion propagation. 
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3.2.2.Roser (1998) 
 
Roser [31] carried out dust explosion propagation tests in a 1-m3 vessel connected to a 
9.22-m long, 100-mm diameter open ended straight pipe. Explosions were initiated in the 
1-m3 vessel and propagated through the straight pipe, which was empty (i.e. contained no 
dust) before each experiment. The vent area was changed between 0 m2 (closed vessel) 
and 0.031 m2. Cornstarch (KSt = 190 bar.m/s) and wheat flour (KSt = 80 bar.m/s) were 
used as fuels. Full flame propagation was obtained under these conditions and a 
maximum flame speed Vmax ~ 416 m/s was obtained with cornstarch.     
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3.3.Explosion propagation following ignition of a dust cloud in a vented vessel 
 
Experiments reviewed in the present section include pipes connected to full-scale vented 
vessels of several cubic meters of volume, and therefore offer a realistic representation of 
industrial systems and explosion scenarios. 
 
3.3.1.Vogl (1996) 
 
Following the first successful series of experiments described in paragraph 3.1.2, Vogl 
[32] added a 9.4-m3 vented initiating vessel between a hopper and a vented cyclone, and 
connected them with two lengths of piping of constant diameter (100 mm or 200 mm) 
and lengths of 18.55 m. A similar cornstarch (KSt = 200 bar m/s) and a significantly less 
reactive wheat flour (KSt = 80 bar m/s) were used as fuels. Dust clouds were ignited by 
two 5-kJ pyrotechnical igniters located at the center of the vessel, thus flame propagation 
could occur in two opposing directions: in the same direction as the dust-air flow (top 
pipe) and in the direction opposite to (and thus against) the dust-air flow (bottom pipe).   
 
Vogl obtained more consistent flame propagation than in the previous experiments, 
independently of the type of fuel, pipe diameter, direction of flame propagation (i.e. 
flame front propagating with or against the dust-air flow), or conveying velocity, for a 
reduced explosion pressure as low as 0.14 bar. In addition to consistent flame 
propagation, flame acceleration, leading to high flame speeds (e.g. up to 600 m/s), were 
also observed.  
 
Vogl found clear chemical effects: the more reactive cornstarch exhibited greater flame 
acceleration and thus higher flame speeds than the less reactive dust, wheat flour. He also 
extensively discusses engineering effects, such as the expansion flow coming from the 
9.4-m3 explosion vessel, as a dominant driving force for the dust explosion propagation 
occurring in the pipes of his experimental setup (the expansion flow (m/s) in the 100 mm 
piping being a factor of 4 greater than the expansion flow in the 200 mm piping). This 
ultimately explains the absence of flame propagation in some cases (wheat flour with 
100-mm and 150-mm diameter pipes and lycopodium with a 100-mm pipe) using the 
previous experimental set up, where there was no initiating vessel. Another engineering 
factor mentioned relates to the importance of the heat balance illustrated in Figure 1, in 
relation to expansion flow. Vogl notes that lower relative heat losses are expected for the 
larger pipe diameters (i.e. 200 mm), yet these can be offset by the higher expansion flow 
rates associated with the pipes with smaller diameters (100 mm).  
 
3.3.2.Vogl & Radandt (2001) 
 
Five years later, Vogl & Radandt [33] reported a comprehensive study of dust explosion 
propagation in small diameter pipes. These experiments are particularly relevant in the 
context of the paragraph 7.6.1.2 of the 2013 edition of NFPA 654, since they fulfill all 
five listed conditions (see also appendix of the present paper): 
1. Cornstarch (KSt = 200 bar.m/s) and wheat flour (KSt = 120 bar.m/s) were used as 
fuels (Table 4), 
2. Experiments involved 27-mm, 42-mm and 82-mm diameter pipes (Figure 5), 
3. Conveying velocity was varied from 0 to 30 m/s, 
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4. No dust was injected into the process pipes, 
5. Interconnected 1-m3 vessels were both vented. 
 
Dust 
Particle 
size 
(μm) 
MEC 
(g/m3) 
Pmax 
(barg) 
KSt 
(bar.m/s) 
MIE 
(mJ) 
MAIT 
(°C) 
Cornstarch 13 60 9 200 5 400 
Wheat flour 38 60 8.5 120 20 390 
Table 4. Ignitability and explosibility characteristics of cornstarch and wheat flour [33] 
 
  
 
  
Figure 5. Dust explosion propagation through an 82-mm diameter pipe  
(total length l = 12 m) from a 1-m3 vented vessel (back) to another 1-m3 vented vessel 
(front) and a vented cyclone (left), FSA testing facility in Kappelrodek, Germany [34] 
 
The authors were surprised that even with a small pipe diameter of 27-mm and with 
wheat flour, there was flame propagation through the entire pipe length. Full flame 
propagation in 42-mm and 82-mm diameter pipes systematically occurred with both 
cornstarch and wheat flour, even for low reduced explosion pressures (< 0.2 bar).  
 
Using the raw experimental data that Vogl and Radandt present in their paper, we 
calculated (Table 5), firstly, the flame speed (Sf) as function of the distance the flame had 
propagated along the length of the three pipes and, secondly, an acceleration factor 
expressed as the ratio of the calculated flame speed at the end of the pipe (as measured 
between flame detectors F5 and F6), relative to the measured flame speed at the 
beginning of the pipe (as measured between flame detectors F1 and F2).  
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Experiment 
D 
(mm) Dust AV (m2) 
Pred 
(bar) 
Sf,1-2 
(m/s) 
Sf,5-6 
(m/s) 
Acceleration 
factor  
(Sf,5-6/Sf, 1-2) 
1 
82 
Cornstarch 
0.4 0.19 87 71 0.8 2 0.27 154 125 0.8 
3 
0.3 
0.37 200 118 0.6 
4 0.79 125 286 2.3 
5 0.95 250 400 1.6 
6 0.2 1.02 182 286 1.6 7 2.77 182 500 2.8 
8 
Wheat 
0.4 0.12 61 * - 9 0.15 45 30 0.7 
10 
0.3 
0.35 222 222 1 
11 0.4 200 200 1 
12 0.4 125 182 1.5 
13 0.2 1.47 105 286 2.7 
14 
42 
Corn 
0.4 0.15 71 47 0.7 
15 0.3 0.41 118 100 0.9 
16 0.2 2.26 200 182 0.9 
17 
Wheat 
0.4 0.08 47 43 0.9 
18 0.3 0.25 100 87 0.9 
19 
0.2 
0.71 182 111 0.6 
20 1.15 133 182 1.4 
21 1.18 200 200 1 
22 
27 Cornstarch 
0.3 0.57 133 34 0.3 23 0.62 125  * - 
24 0.2 2.19 222 167 0.8 25 Wheat 1 143 100 0.7 
Table 5. Experimental matrix calculated using the data of Vogl & Radandt [33]. 
Cells in grey highlight results in which flame speed acceleration occurred. 
*In these two cases, flame did not propagate to the last flame detector 
 
Whereas flame propagation systematically occurred over the full length of the pipe with 
both powders, independently of the pipe diameter, flame acceleration, on the contrary, 
was mainly observed with cornstarch (and to a lesser extent wheat flour) in the 82-mm 
pipe. As indicated by its higher KSt-value (Table 4), cornstarch is more reactive than 
wheat flour and therefore shows a greater tendency to exhibit flame acceleration (Table 
5). Flame acceleration likelihood (Table 5, grey cells) generally increased with fuel 
reactivity, pipe diameter and reduced pressure in the vented vessel (Pred). 
Vogl & Radandt clearly showed and explained the factors influencing the behavior of 
dust explosions occurring in inter-connected equipment. Factors increasing the violence 
of dust explosions, i.e. significant flame speed acceleration, include: greater fuel 
reactivity or chemistry on one hand, larger diameter of inter-connecting piping and higher 
pressure of a primary dust explosion, considered engineering factors, on the other hand. 
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These researchers also briefly describe competing mechanisms influencing the violence 
of explosions in inter-connected equipment that have been discussed in paragraph 2. 
They cite, firstly, the role of pipe diameter in influencing the heat balance (as illustrated 
in Figure 1 of this article); too small a diameter acts as a flame quencher. And secondly, 
the role of pipe diameter in increasing turbulence: a smaller diameter tends to increase 
turbulence, which increases flame surface area, which, in turn, stimulates flame 
acceleration.  
 
3.3.3.Vogl (2015) 
 
Further evidence of dust explosion propagation in small diameter pipes is provided by 
experiments conducted by Vogl [34] involving a 4.4-m3 vented vessel connected to a 1-
m3 vented vessel with a 20-m long, 100-mm diameter pipe diameter (Figure 6). 
Cornstarch was used as a fuel (KSt = 200 bar.m/s). A dust concentration of 1,000 g/m³ 
was achieved in each vessel, and the dust cloud was ignited at the center of the large 
vessel. Under such conditions, the flame propagated over the full 20-m pipe length, and 
the maximum velocity of the flame front in the pipe reached 300 m/s. The reduced 
explosion overpressure in both vessels was about 1 bar. 
 
  
 
  
Figure 6. Dust explosion propagation through a 100-mm diameter pipe (length l = 20 m) 
from a 4.4-m3 vented vessel to 1-m3 vented vessel, FSA testing facility in Kappelrodek, 
Germany [34] 
 
3.3.4.Roser et al. (2010) 
 
The final example of dust explosion propagation in small diameter pipes of our study 
involve an operating and vented (boot, legs and head) twin-leg bucket elevator [35] as 
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seen in Figure 7. Malt was used as a fuel (KSt = 143 bar.m/s). Ignition was provided in 
the bucket elevator head. Explosion propagation via a 15-m long, 100-mm diameter 
dedusting pipe connecting the bucket elevator to a vented cyclone can be observed in 
sequence on the four photographs.  
 
  
 
  
Figure 7. Flame propagation between a vented twin-leg bucket elevator (top left) and a 
vented cyclone (jet flame emerging from the bottom right) [35] 
 
Whereas not discussed in detail, Roser, Vogl and Radandt did comment on the interplay 
between chemical and engineering factors in influencing the course and violence of dust 
explosions, as expressed in terms of flame velocities and explosion overpressures 
occurring in their test equipment. In these tests, engineering factors related to turbulence-
increasing factors, such as an optimal clearance (i.e. gap) between the buckets and their 
enclosing duct, relative to heat loss factors, as related to the size of the surface area of the 
buckets.  
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4.Conclusions 
 
Dust explosion propagation in small pipes has always been a controversial topic. The 
previous edition of NFPA 654 standard allowed the absence of explosion isolation as 
long as several requirements were met, the main condition being that the diameter of the 
system’s piping must be less than 4 inches.  
 
Our detailed review of dust explosion in small diameter pipes reveals that propagation 
has been consistently observed by different researchers and for various configurations in 
pipe diameters down to one-inch only. The experimental work done by Vogl, and then 
Vogl & Radandt, can be considered the most comprehensive study illustrating dust 
explosion propagation in small diameter pipes. The researchers show that, even though 
the likelihood of flame propagation seems to decrease with pipe diameter, propagation 
remains a realistic scenario even for low reduced explosion pressure in the initiating 
vessel (< 0.2 bar).  
 
The data also shows that both chemical and physical mechanisms determine the onset and 
intensity of explosion propagation in small diameter pipes: 
• Increasing chemical and thermodynamic reactivity of the powders concerned 
tends to facilitate propagation in smaller diameter pipes. In general, chemical 
reactivity increases with smaller and drier particles. It is also to be expected that 
reactivity is highest for particles with high volumetric heats of combustion (J/m3) 
and high adiabatic flame temperatures, such as metal powders; 
• Engineering factors, including inter-connectedness of piping with vessels, length 
and diameter of piping, vessel volume, vessel protection, as well as flow rate and 
flow direction, which relate to physical transport phenomena associated with heat 
losses and development of turbulence, also influence the course of dust explosions. 
On one hand, reducing pipe diameter tends to hamper flame propagation owing to 
higher surface to volume ratio. On the other hand, smaller diameters lead to 
higher flow rates once a given pressure starts to develop, which enhances 
turbulence levels and the rate of heat release. Thus, for a given set of chemical 
parameters, and given engineering factors associated with the geometric setup, 
there may be a worst-case, optimum diameter corresponding to the maximum 
flame acceleration over a given length of piping, which can potentially lead to a 
deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT). The addition of a volume provides an 
additional driving force for the propagation of the explosion: the expanding gases 
generated by the combustion of the dust-air mixture in a large volume (compared 
to the pipe volume) can act as a piston, which can propel the flame front down the 
pipe, generating further turbulence and increasing flame area. The action of this 
piston is more pronounced for higher overpressures and longer duration 
explosions (i.e. greater impulse); this means ultimately that the design (i.e. 
explosion pressure resistance) and the method of protection of the process vessel 
can significantly impact the propagation likelihood and distance within a given 
pipe.  
 
Vogl and Radandt recommend, and our analysis of a larger set of experiments supports 
this recommendation, not ruling out the possibility of dust explosion propagation in small 
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diameter pipes but, on the contrary, to consider it carefully for the design and operation 
of powder handling systems. 
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Appendix 
 
Previous requirements by NFPA 654, 2013 edition 
 
7.1.6.1 
“Where an explosion hazard exists, isolation devices shall be provided to prevent 
deflagration propagation between connected equipment in accordance with NFPA 69.” 
 
7.1.6.2 
“The requirement of 7.1.6.1 shall not apply where all of the following conditions are met: 
(1) The material being conveyed is not a metal dust or hybrid mixture 
(2) The connecting ductwork is smaller than 4 in. (100 mm) nominal diameter 
(3) The maximum concentration of dust conveyed through the duct is less than 25 percent 
of the minimum explosive concentration (MEC) of the material 
(4) The conveying velocity is sufficient to prevent accumulation of combustible dust in the 
duct 
(5) All connected equipment is properly designed for explosion protection by means other 
than deflagration pressure containment” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
